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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate incentives other than altruism that developed countries
have in improving technologies speciﬁc to developing countries. We propose a simple
model of international trade between two regions, in which all individuals have similar
preferences over an inferior good and a luxury good. The poor region has a comparative
advantage in the production of the inferior good, and the rich in the luxury good. Even
when costly adaptation of the technology to the poor region’s characteristics is required
— which makes the technology inappropriate for local use — we show that there are
parameter conﬁgurations for which the rich region has an incentive to incur this cost.
By raising the eﬃciency of the productive process of the developing region, the developed
region can redirect its own productive resources toward the luxury good; it can also gain
access to a more diversiﬁed set of consumption choices. Indeed, there are cases where
the rich region would prefer to improve the poor region’s technology for producing the
inferior good rather than its own. Such technology transfers can increase the welfare of
both regions. We apply our model to the Green Revolution and provide a quantitative
assessment of its welfare eﬀects.
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Calls are made, often on humanitarian grounds, for the developed countries to become ac-
tively involved in solving economic problems particular to developing countries. For instance,
Jeﬀrey Sachs (1999) makes the plea: “Research and development of new technologies are over-
whelmingly directed at rich-country problems. To the extent that the poor face distinctive
challenges, science and technology must be directed purposefully towards them,” and goes
on to argue that the rich countries should fund research into malaria and AIDS vaccines for
the poor countries.1 Referring to the “Green Revolution”, an international eﬀort directed
toward developing high-yield plant breeds to address the food needs of the developing world,
Evenson and Gollin (2001) assert: “Literally millions of people are alive today who would
have otherwise died from hunger or from diseases related to inadequate nutrition.”
The beneﬁts to poor countries from improved seed varieties and vaccines might seem
obvious; however, for the rich countries, is altruism the only motivation to spend resources
to invent or improve technologies for the poor? Under what circumstances would the indus-
trialized world ﬁnd that developing and donating technological innovations to the developing
region is also in its own economic self-interest, even if such technologies were inappropriate
for its own use? How is its welfare aﬀected by improvements in the poor region’s technologies
or by an increase in its labor force, say through an increase in life expectancy? These are a
few of the questions we address in this paper.
Consider, for example, the Green Revolution. The establishment of the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in 1971 solidiﬁed the international
eﬀorts in this regard that had begun as early as the 1940s. The achievements of this rev-
olution in increasing food production and decreasing prices have been nothing less than
staggering.2 Clearly, increased use of inputs, improvements in irrigation, mechanization,
and better education of farmers played important roles in this process; nevertheless, the
introduction of new seed varieties by the international community played a pivotal role.3
The cost of such research, while not insigniﬁcant, was not particularly high. Evenson and
Gollin (2000) report that the funding for the CGIAR has been about 5 billion US dollars
1McArthur and Sachs (2001) provide some evidence that variables such as the incidence of malaria aﬀect
the per capita GNP. Gallup and Sachs (2000) go further, and argue that intensive malaria negatively aﬀects
growth.
2The real price of food in international markets is less than half its level of 50 years ago. The FAO’s
index of food production per capita for developing countries shows a 50% increase from 1969-71 to 1998-
2000. The yield of rice for all developing countries soared from 1,756 kilograms/hectare in 1961 to 3,798
kilograms/hectare in 2000. See Evenson and Gollin (2001) for a comprehensive and fascinating summary.
3Evenson and Rosegrant (2001) estimate that if the developing countries had not availed themselves of
crop genetic improvements, prices would have been 35 to 66 percent higher and production would have been
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1since 1971, and its budget for 1998 was $340 million.
The beneﬁts to the poor countries of international eﬀorts such as the Green Revolution
have been catalogued in detail; but little has been said about the economic incentives the
developed countries have for researching technologies inappropriate for their own use. An
improvement in the technology or the health of poor countries could allow the rich countries
to shift resources away from the goods typically produced by poor countries and allow them
to focus on more advanced goods wherein their advantage lies. The expansion of the market
for its good is particularly beneﬁcial to the rich countries if the goods they produce are
mostly luxury goods and services, while those produced by the poor countries are inferior
goods such as food crops.
In order to study these issues, we develop a non-altruistic model of the world, which
has two regions that trade with each other. Preferences are identical, and deﬁned over an
inferior (“agricultural”) good and a luxury (“non-agricultural” or “manufacturing”) good.
We conduct a preliminary static analysis to argue that the rich region beneﬁts from an
improvement in the poor region’s technology for producing the labor-intensive, inferior good,
and is hurt by an improvement in the capital-intensive, luxury good. If the labor force of
the poor region is suﬃciently large, the rich region prefers to improve the poor region’s
agricultural technology to its own. Furthermore, it prefers an improvement in the poor
region’s production technology to an increase in the life expectancy of the citizens of that
region.
We use these outcomes to specify a simpliﬁed production structure for the dynamic model,
which allows us to conduct steady-state and transitional analysis. Now, the developing region
produces only the inferior good using labor as the sole input, and the developed region
produces this, as well as a luxury good, which requires both capital and labor. We further
assume that technology is speciﬁc to a region and that the developing countries are unable to
commit to future payments in return for technological assistance; consequently, technology
transfers must take the form of donations.4 Initially, we abstract from the costs of technology
improvements and focus on comparative statics that highlight the basic forces at work.5 In
a steady state in which the rich region produces both goods, an improvement in the poor
region’s technology induces reallocation of the rich region’s labor force toward the luxury
good and increases its income; there is no improvement in its terms of trade. The poor
region’s income experiences a direct increase. However, when the rich region is specialized
4A case for this assumption can be made on the basis of empirical relevance. More important for us is the
conservative nature of this assumption; if it can be shown that the rich countries have an incentive to provide
technologies speciﬁc to poor countries for free, it will be all the more likely they would do so when paid for
these technologies.
5Given the evidence on low costs of improvements presented earlier, this exercise is not empirically irrele-
vant.
2in producing only the luxury good, an improvement in the poor region’s technology makes
the terms of trade more favorable for the rich and increases its income; there is no factor
reallocation eﬀect. The poor beneﬁt from increased output, but are hurt by the terms of
trade eﬀect. In this case, there are parameter conﬁgurations in which the net eﬀect from
better technology is also beneﬁcial to the poor.
We then incorporate the cost of technology improvements explicitly, via a quadratic
cost function. While these costs might not be quantitatively important, explicitly modeling
them allows us to analyze the technological investment choices individual regions face, and to
compare individual investments to that of a world social planner.6 Given the non-rival nature
of technology and the resulting scale eﬀect, if the poor country has a large enough workforce,
the beneﬁts for the rich from researching inappropriate technology could outweigh those
from appropriate improvements. Therefore, the rich would prefer to research their trading
partner’s agricultural sector rather than their own. While individual countries perceive the
beneﬁts of better technology only on their own income and terms of trade, the social planner
would evaluate the impact on both regions. Therefore, in the non-specialized case where both
countries experience an increase in income, the planner’s investment in improving the poor
regions’ technology exceeds that of the rich country acting on its own self-interest. When
specialization prevails, however, the redistributive eﬀects induced by the terms of trade hurt
the poor at the expense of the rich. In this case, the rich overinvest relative to the eﬃcient
outcome.
We analyze the transition from a low level of technology in the poor region to a higher
one; the dichotomy mentioned earlier between increased production versus improved terms
of trade becomes less stark when transition is also considered. For instance, when the rich
region is not specialized, there is a terms of trade improvement during the transition, even
if there is none in the steady state.
Though the model allows us to address issues of broader interest, the Green Revolution
appears to be a natural application for it. The above-mentioned dynamic analysis sets
the stage for providing a quantitative assessment of the Green Revolution using numerical
simulations. We ﬁnd positive welfare beneﬁts for both the poor and the rich regions in most
cases, with the relative magnitudes of the gains mirroring the theoretical analysis summarized
above.
Given the likelihood of Pareto improvement, why are such international “interventions”
rare? We have considered regions and ignored the individual countries that form a region.
The free riding problems inherent in technology improvement are likely to be a major disin-
centive for a given rich country to improve the poor region’s technology on its own: countries
that do not share the cost of research will also beneﬁt. The issues of how sovereign entities
6The planner’s problem could be seen as a version of the world in which the markets for technology
production and sales or licensing by the rich region are complete.
3form consortia to ensure the provision of this “public” technology, and why certain provisions
such as improved crop seeds met with better success than the currently debated provision of
lifesaving drugs, are interesting in their own right and are the subject of ongoing research.7
However, in this paper we abstract from such considerations and assume that rich countries
eﬀectively coordinate their actions and can be treated as a region. We focus instead on the
ﬁrst step of theoretically and quantitatively assessing the beneﬁts, if any, of such a provision,
and on the mechanics of trade and the transition that ensues.8
The eﬀect of a donation of goods on the welfare of the recipient country is often discussed
in textbooks of international economics, and the result typically hinges on diﬀerential income
elasticities of the donor and recipient country for the donated good. We focus on the less
frequently encountered topic of technology development by the rich for the poor, and the
resulting increase in welfare. Moreover, our results do not hinge on diﬀerences in preferences.
There is also an extensive literature on how a country can increase the terms of trade in
its favor by levying a tariﬀ on the imported good; it can balance the consumer distortion
arising from such a tariﬀ with increases in producer surplus and revenues, and arrive at an
optimal tariﬀ. However, unlike technology improvements, optimal tariﬀs will hurt the poor
region. And as is often pointed out, the optimal tariﬀ is an interesting theoretical possibility
but one that is diﬃcult to implement in practice, given the possibility of retaliation and the
ineﬃciencies involved in disbursing the collected tariﬀs. Nevertheless, we brieﬂyc o n s i d e r
tariﬀs in our setup in Section 7.
Romer and Rivera-Batiz (1991) are also interested in the eﬀects of economic integration
and technological progress. However, they focus on the pure scale eﬀects of integration and
“do not consider the general case of trade between countries with diﬀerent endowments and
technologies,” as we do. Matsuyama (2000) develops a Ricardian model of two regions in
which “North” specializes in higher income elasticity goods and “South” in lower elasticity
goods. North cannot lose from an improvement its own productivity, while South may lose
from an improvement in its productivity; it specializes in goods whose demand does not
increase with income and is thus forced to reallocate labor toward industries in which it does
7In the next section we present a preliminary analysis on why the rich region might prefer an improvement
in the crop technology of the poor country to an increase in the life expectancy of that country’s citizens.
8We also abstract from the exact mechanism by which the developed regions raise funds for developing the
poor region’s technology without thwarting the incentives of the private sector that produces the technology
in the ﬁrst place. The following quote from the Economist dated February 22, 2001, is relevant in this regard:
“The case for much more generous provision of life-saving drugs to the developing countries is irresistible
both morally and as a matter of economics. But it is naive, wrong and in the long run counter-productive, to
expect the cost of this aid to be met out of drug-company proﬁts. Instead, rich-world taxpayers should pay.
It would be much better to spend aid money on drugs for developing countries than it is to waste it in the
usual ways.”
Also see Sachs, Kremer, and Hamoudi (2001) on this matter.
4not have a comparative advantage. The good structure is much simpler in our model, and
the diﬀerence in income elasticities is not necessary for our results; it merely ampliﬁes the
incentive the rich region has in improving the poor region’s technology. The non-specialized
and specialized regimes we study provide a useful dichotomy in understanding the roles
of increased production and improved terms of trade in expanding the value of the rich
region’s overseas markets; our analysis thus provides an additional perspective on the issue
of market expansion analyzed by Matsuyama. We are also concerned with the identity of the
technology producer and the potential cost of its production, which makes our goal diﬀerent
from his.
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) are interested in quantifying the international diﬀerences
in productivity and output arising from a mismatch of the technologies developed for rich
countries and the low skills of workers in the poor countries where these technologies are used.
Their frame of reference for inappropriateness is the poor country; ours is the rich country.
The mismatch that they document further justiﬁes the need for directed development of
technologies suitable for poor countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we do preliminary analysis on
a static model to set the stage for the dynamic model to follow. In Section 3, we present this
dynamic model and characterize steady state outcomes when the developed region produces
both goods as well as when it specializes in the luxury good. In Section 4, we conduct the
steady state welfare analysis when technology improvement is costly. We characterize the
transitional dynamics that follow technology improvements in Section 5. In Section 6, we
present a quantitative assessment of the welfare eﬀects by interpreting the Green Revolution
in light of our model, and in Section 7, we present a brief discussion on tariﬀs. Section 8
concludes.
2 A Preliminary Analysis
Our aim is to argue that there are incentives for the rich region to develop technologies that
might be inappropriate for itself but are of use to the poor countries; these incentives may
even lead the rich to forgo technological improvements more appropriate to its own domestic
sectors. In this section, we highlight these incentives using a static framework. We will later
use the lessons learned from this static analysis to motivate a simpliﬁed production structure
on which dynamic analysis can be conducted.
We consider a world formed of two regions — developing, or poor, subscripted by P,
and developed, or rich, subscripted by R — whose citizens value consumption of two goods,












for region i = P,R. The constant mi > 0 is the minimum amount of good 1 that must be
5consumed by region i. This good can be thought of as a necessity; it is straightforward to
show that the income elasticity of demand is smaller than one for good 1, and greater than
one for good 2. The degree of inferiority is increasing in mi.9 The weight of good 1 in the
overall utility is denoted by θ. As mentioned in the introduction, it is not strictly correct to
think of a “region” as an individual “country”; however, for simplicity, we will use the two
terms interchangeably.10
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¢1−β . Here Ki,L i, are factor endowments of
region i. We assume β>α ,so that good 2 is the capital intensive good. The labor intensive
good is thus the inferior one. This fairly general production structure becomes analytically
intractable rather quickly, so we start by analyzing the welfare eﬀects of technology improve-
ments in the special case of α =0and β =1 . We thus have Y 1
i = A1
iLi and Y 2
i = A2
iKi. This
allows us to abstract from factor allocation decisions within the country and focus on the
income and price eﬀects induced by technology changes, and arrive at intuitive and tractable
conditions. The forces outlined below will also be present in the general case of α,β ∈ (0,1),
where the GNP of a region will be additionally aﬀected by changes in factor allocations.
Optimization of each country’s problem, together with the market clearing conditions














IP ≡ Y 1














IR ≡ Y 1














where p is the price of good 2 relative to the numeraire (good 1), and IP and IR are the
GNPs of the poor and rich countries. The GNP of individual countries can be directly
9The minimum consumption is indexed by i to allow for the possibility that the norms for a mimum, say
as deﬁned by the poverty level, can change with the level of development. See Chatterjee and Ravikumar
(1999) for an exposition on minimum consumption in a macroeconomic context.
10In the presence of a minimum consumption requirement, the representative agent construct needs to
be interpreted with caution; Engel curves have intercepts diﬀerent from zero. If one derived the aggregate
demand curve for good 1 by adding up individual demand curves for which the minimum consumption is
satisﬁe d ,i tw i l lb es a t i s ﬁed in the aggregate as well. If, instead, the economy’s aggregate income were given
to a representative agent, the satisfaction of the minimum consumption requirement in the aggregate does
not necessarily mean it will be satisﬁed for every individual. We abstract from this possibility.
Throughout the paper, we interpret the minimum consumption requirements mi as aggregate requirements
proportional to population size. Given this, we use the aggregate agent’s utility for analysis instead of
multiplying individual utility by the number of agents. This is done for ease of exposition and nothing
crucial, including the scale eﬀect, depends on this.
11Appendix A.1 provides the complete expressions.
6aﬀected by a change in the technological coeﬃcients and / or by a change in the price p;
the above expressions for Ij capture the reduced form relationship between income and the
parameters of interest, once the expression for the price has been substituted. The indirect
utility function of country i, excluding constants, is:
Vi =l o g
¡
Y 1
i + pY 2
i − mi
¢
− (1 − θ)log(p). (2)
Increased production exerts a positive eﬀect on a region’s welfare; absent factor allocation,
such an increase can happen when there is technology improvement. When the relative
price, p, increases, there is a positive eﬀect on welfare due to an increase in GNP and a
negative eﬀect due to an increase in the cost of consumption; one can view the positive
eﬀect as an “income” or a “production” eﬀect and the negative eﬀect as a “substitution”
or “consumption” eﬀect. Which of these two eﬀects dominates will depend on technological
parameters and factor endowments.
Absent altruism, the rich country’s stance toward improvement of a technology can be
evaluated in terms of the eﬀe c to ni t so w nw e l f a r e ,VR. In what follows, we use this criterion
to evaluate the following questions which seem interesting a priori: 1) Does the rich country
beneﬁt more from an improvement in the poor country’s technology for producing the labor
intensive good or in the capital intensive good? 2) When does the beneﬁt to the rich country
of an improvement in the poor country’s technology exceed the beneﬁt of an improvement
in its own technology? 3) Does the rich country beneﬁt more from an improvement in a
speciﬁc technology of the poor country, say crop seeds, or by a general improvement in
the poor country’s condition, say by an increase in life expectancy? 4) What role does the
inferiority of the labor-intensive good play? Recall that the immediate aim is to identify the
incentives for the rich country and motivate a simple production structure for the dynamic
model, rather than derive categorical claims.
1. Which poor country good to target? As seen from (1), an increase in the poor
country’s technology for good 1, A1
P, increases the relative price, p, while an increase
in the poor country’s technology for good 2, A2
P, decreases this price. As argued
above, a price change had an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare in general. However, if
the poor country is abundant in labor, and the rich country is abundant in capital,
the production eﬀect of a price increase dominates the consumption eﬀect in welfare
considerations of the rich country; the rich country would, therefore, prefer a price




















If the rich country has a comparative advantage in good 2, its welfare increases when
the poor country technology for producing good 1 is improved, but decreases when the
poor country’s technology for producing good 2 is improved. As Dixit and Norman
(1980; p.139) say, “...the foreign country is bound to beneﬁt from technical progress
7in the home country’s export industry.” The rich region would prefer to improve the
technology of the poor country’s export good, which we have assumed, in an empirically
consistent way, is labor intensive. The terms of trade for the rich country, which is a
net exporter of good 2 given the above pattern of comparative advantage, improves.
We also verify that ∂VP/∂A1
P > 0, so that there is no “immiserization” and the poor
region has an incentive to accept the new technology.
2. Improve own technology or the poor country’s technology? If the poor coun-
try’s technology for good 1, A1
P, is improved, the rich country beneﬁts only through an
increase in the relative price p. If, on the other hand, the rich country’s own technology
for good 1, A1
R, is improved, it directly beneﬁts from an increase in its output, Y 1
R,a s
well as a higher relative price p. However, given that the poor country is abundant in
labor, it is conceivable that the intensity of the price eﬀect from an improvement in the
“inappropriate” technology is strong enough for the rich country to prefer an improve-
ment in A1
P, to an improvement in its own technology. The eﬀect of an improvement
in A1
P is magniﬁed by the size of the poor country’s labor force. If this labor force is
large enough, improving A1
P m i g h tb eam o r ee ﬀective way of generating a terms of
trade improvement for the rich country than improving A1
R. Indeed, one can show that






,p r o v i d e dA2
RKR >A 2
PKP and LP >L R are also
satisﬁed.12
Therefore, for the rich country to prefer an improvement in the inappropriate technol-
ogy, conditions stronger than the comparative advantage condition, (3), are needed;
the rich country needs to be a large enough producer of good 2, and the poor country
amply endowed with labor to be a large enough producer of good 1.13
3. I m p r o v et e c h n o l o g yo rl i f ee x p e c t a n c y ?We have captured an increase in the poor
country’s technology, say through an improvement of crop seeds, by an increase in the
technological coeﬃcient A1
P. Likewise, it seems reasonable to capture an increase in
the life expectancy of the country’s citizens, say through the development of malarial
drugs, by an increase in the labor force LP. For the α =0 , β =1case, it is easy to see
that the rich region treats increases in both parameters symmetrically, as there is no
labor allocation decision involved. In the more general case, where labor can be used
to produce good 1 or good 2, the poor region might have an incentive to allocate some



















PKP and LP >L R, the




P KP , retrieving condition (3).
13When factor endowments and minimum consumption levels are identical across countries, (LP = LR = L,
KP = KR = K, mP = mR = m), it is straighforward to show that the rich country will never beneﬁtm o r e
from a marginal increment in A
1
P when compared to a similar change in A
1
R.T h a ti s ,∂VR/∂A
1
P <∂ V R/∂A
1
R.
8of the increase in labor to producing good 2 and “compete” with the rich country, thus
numbing the impact on the terms of trade. We consider the case of α =0 , β<1,
to illustrate this eﬀect; labor is used to produce both goods, while capital is used to
produce only good 2. In this case, one can show ∂Y 2
P/∂LP > 0, as conjectured above.
Both A1
P and LP aﬀect VR only through p, and one can show that the rich country
prefers the option that increases this relative price the most. An increase in A1
P (tech-
nology improvement), induces an increase in the allocation of the poor country’s labor
to the production of good 1 in addition to a direct eﬀect on output; this translates
into a greater increase in the price of go o d2t h a nt h eo n ec a u s e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nLP
(health improvement). Therefore, if the poor country is endowed with abundant labor,
LP, relative to technology, A1
P, which is the empirically plausible case, it follows that
∂VR/∂A1
P >∂ V R/∂LP.
Evidently, the rich region would prefer to donate directed technologies, such as seeds
speciﬁc to the poor region’s climate, rather than “general purpose” technologies, such
as drugs to cure tropical diseases, which can eﬀectively cause the developing region to
compete in the rich region’s export good sector.14
4. What role does inferiority play? We answer this question by reverting to the
α =0 , β =1case and examining how ∂VR/∂A1
P varies with the minimum consumption
level. For simplicity, we now set mP = mR = m. First, note that the strength of the
price response increases with the inferiority of good 1. That is, dlnp/dlnA1
P increases





to be positive; but it cannot be unambiguously signed even if (3) holds, since an
increase in m aﬀects the strength of both the income and the substitution eﬀects in
∂VR/∂A1





> 0 is more stringent and is satisﬁed
for low enough A2
PKP a n dh i g he n o u g hA2
RKR; in other words, the rich country’s
production advantage in good 2 has to be strong enough for the income eﬀect to
outweigh the substitution eﬀect.15 For instance, values of A2
RKR =1 0 ,A 2
1KP =0 .2,
A1
RLR−mR =2 ,A 1
PLP −mP =1 , would ensure that the beneﬁt to the rich country of
raising A1





P, these numbers imply that the cross partial is positive if the
14This conclusion is robust to our interpretation that the minimum consumption requirements are eﬀectively
aggregate magnitudes. A larger population raises the aggregate subsistence consumption levels of good 1;
therefore, the increase in p is muted, causing the rich to prefer technology improvement to health improvement
for the poor.































9rich-poor capital ratio is 20, and the rich-poor labor force ratio is 0.5, both of which
are empirically reasonable.
To summarize, the lessons we learn from this analysis are that the rich country beneﬁts
most from an improvement in the poor country’s technology for the good: 1) in which the
rich country does not have a comparative advantage, 2) which is produced in large quantities
in the poor country, 3) whose technological development cannot spill over to other goods,
i.e. is directed, and 4) which is inferior.
In the more general case where α,β ∈ (0,1), changes in both the factor allocation and the
terms of trade arising from an improvement in the poor country’s technology would aﬀect
the rich country’s GNP, but welfare will continue to be evaluated using equation (2) and its
counterpart for VP. The relative strengths of the income and substitution eﬀects, which in
turn would depend on the actual values of these coeﬃcients, would continue to determine
the welfare eﬀects of technological change.16
In the following section, we introduce our dynamic model. The poor country produces
only the inferior good, while the rich country is capable of producing this good as well as a
luxury good. As we show below, the rich country will ﬁnd itself in one of two regimes. If the
poor country is not too eﬃcient in producing its good, the rich country produces both goods
(the non-specialization regime). Otherwise, the rich country will become fully specialized
in the production of the luxury good (the specialization regime).17 We ﬁnd this dichotomy
useful in illustrating the two eﬀects of an increase in the poor country’s technology on the
rich country’s GNP. In the non-specialization regime, the rich country beneﬁts in the steady
state only by reallocating labor toward the good in which it has a comparative advantage,
the luxury good; there is no improvement in its terms of trade. In the specialization regime,
the rich country beneﬁts in the steady state only by an improvement in the terms of trade;
there is obviously no factor reallocation eﬀect. The real world would correspond, of course,
to a convex combination of the two scenarios in our model; as we will see, this is especially
true when the transition is considered.
16Higher A
1
P, for example, will lead the rich country to reallocate capital and labor to sector 2, raising its
output in this sector while reducing it in sector 1. In turn, higher output in sector 2 dampens the initial
upward impact on the price p of a higher A
1
P. For the poor country, given higher A
1
P and higher p,a tt h i s
level of generality the net eﬀect on resource reallocation is not clear. However, given earlier assumptions on
labor abundance and labor intensity of good 1 similar results should continue to obtain.
As an aside, in Matsuyama (2000), where there is satiation and a strict ordering of goods in terms of their
income elasticities, poor countries redirect resources to industries where they have a comparative disadvantage,
which, in our case, would correspond to the poor country raising its output in sector 2 or the rich in sector 1.
17Except for the fact the poor country does not produce good 2, the specialized environment is very similar
to the α =0 , β<1 model discussed above.
103 The Dynamic Model
The notation for the regions and the goods as well as the preference speciﬁcation were
introduced in the previous section. We now present a simpliﬁed production structure, based
on the lessons learned from the previous analysis.
The poor region can produce only the inferior good. Its total production of good 1, YP,
is given by:
YP = APLP,
where LP is the total labor force of this country and AP is a productivity measure.18






R > AP and the amount of labor used in the production of good 1, L1
R 6 LR, the
total labor force. Production of the luxury good, labeled 2, requires both capital and labor











R > 0 is the eﬃciency parameter characterizing sector 2, LR is the total labor
force, and KR the stock of physical capital of the rich country.19 As in the previous section,
sector 1 can be thought of as representing agriculture, and sector 2, manufacturing (“non-
agricultural” in general). Capital evolves according to ˙ KR = iR − δKR, where iR denotes
gross investment by the rich country. The developed region decides how to allocate its labor
between the two sectors and how much to invest in physical capital. We make the realistic
assumption that the manufacturing good alone is used for accumulating capital.
The poor country’s eﬃciency parameter, AP, is of fundamental importance for our analy-
sis. Indeed, one of our purposes is to argue that the rich country could beneﬁtf r o mm a k i n g
the poor country more eﬃcient, and describe forces relevant to this outcome. We also wish
to compare the beneﬁts from increasing AP to those associated with increasing A1
R.T h e r e -
fore, we will solve for and highlight the dependence of the main variables (prices, quantities,
welfare) on AP and A1
R as we proceed.20
18We have suppressed the superscript, since the poor countries produce only one good. We have assumed
that all poor countries can be lumped into a region and the same technology is appropriate for all. Given
that a vast majority of the developing countries are in the arid or semi-arid tropics, agricultural and health
concerns are likely to be very similar for them.
19Our main results should go through when capital is used in both sectors provided the technology for good
1 is less capital intensive than the technology for good 2.
20We assume that the parameters of the model satisfy the following inequality:


























Since this country has no dynamic choices to make, the solution to its optimization problem
is trivially given by:
c1
P = θYP +( 1− θ)mP (5)
c2






















subject to the constraints:
c1
R + pc2








˙ KR = iR − δKR. (8)







































˙ λ − ρλ = −HKR
i











as well as the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital. Here λ1 and λ are the
multipliers on the budget constraint and the law of motion, respectively.










+( 1− θ)mR (14)
c2












This assumption guarantees that, if good 1 is only produced by the poor country, the output will be enough to
satisfy both countries’ aggregate minimal consumption requirements. It also ensures the empirically plausible
outcome of the rich country consuming more of good 2 than the poor country.
12If condition (12) holds with equality, both goods are produced by the rich country. This














However, if (12) is a strict inequality even when L1
R =0 , the rich country specializes in
good 2 and good 1 is produced only by the poor country. In what follows, we analyze the
specialized and non-specialized cases separately.
3.1 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is simply deﬁned as both regions optimizing acc o r d i n gt ot h ep r o b l e m sg i v e n
above, and the following market clearing condition being satisﬁed:
c1
P + c1
R = YP + Y 1
R.
Using the ﬁrst order conditions for consumption in the two regions in the above equilibrium









YP + Y 1
R − (mP + mR)
¤
. (17)
The value of the world consumption of good 2 is equated to the value of total consumption
of good 1 in excess of the minimum requirements, up to a factor of the utility weights.
3.2 Steady State: Non-Specialization
We ﬁrst examine the steady-state outcomes; transition analysis is conducted in Section 5.
We highlight the impact of AP on the rich country’s welfare when the cost of improving
this technology is negligible; in section 4, we assume a plausible cost function for such
improvements to study the net eﬀect on welfare. For notational simplicity, we omit the
asterisk notation that is commonly used for steady state quantities; however, it is to be
understood that all quantities are evaluated at the steady state.
We analyze the steady state when the rich region produces both goods to substantiate
the following claim.
Claim 1 When A1
R i sl a r g ee n o u g hr e l a t i v et oAP, LR is not too small relative to LP,a n d
the minimum consumption requirements are suﬃciently large, the rich country produces both
goods. An increase in the technology of the poor country, AP:
1. Has no eﬀect on the steady state terms of trade.
21By using the rich region’s budget constraint with the market clearing condition for good 1 one can obtain








= YP − c
1
P.
132. Increases the rich country’s capital stock, its production of good 2, its income, and
welfare, in the steady state. These eﬀects are magniﬁe db yt h es i z eo ft h ep o o rc o u n t r y ’ s
labor force and, in the case of welfare, by the degree of inferiority of good 1.
3. Increases the output and the welfare of the poor country.
4. Is preferred by the rich country to an increase in its own technology for the correspond-
ing good if the labor force in the poor country is large enough.












This condition pins down the capital-to-laborr a t i oi ns e c t o r2i nt e r m so ft h ed e v e l o p e d
world’s technological and preference parameters alone. At the steady state, iR = δKR,a s
usual.















In this case, the long-run relative price is determined solely by the parameters of the rich
country. The dynamic condition (18) equates the marginal product of capital to the cost of
investment thereby pinning down the steady state capital-to-labor ratio in sector 2 purely
in terms of the rich country’s parameters. The static condition (16) equates the marginal
product of labor across the two sectors and pins down the steady state price in terms of the
previously derived capital-to-labor ratio. Thus the steady state relative price is unaﬀected
by any change in the technology of the poor country. As we will see later, there will be a
relative price eﬀect in transition when AP increases.22















which is a decreasing, linear function of L1
R.
The equilibrium choice of L1
R can be shown, from (17) and (19), to be:
L1
R = aLR − b




22These implications would obtain even if only good 1 were used as the investment good or if investment






14where a and b are positive constants that depend only on model fundamentals.23 The rich
country’s employment in sector 1 will depend positively on its labor force, LR,a n do ni t s
eﬃciency in producing this good, A1
R, and negatively on the productive eﬃciency of the poor
country, AP, and on its labor force, LP. Moreover, by calculating ∂L1
R/∂AP,o n ec a ns e e
that the negative impact of AP on the labor force devoted to agriculture in the rich countries
is magniﬁed by the size of the poor country’s labor force. This is a scale eﬀect of technology
which we will see repeatedly; the larger the labor force of the poor region working with the
technology, the greater the eﬀect of improving it.24
From (18), one can also see that the steady-state capital stock KR increases with AP;a n
















and all these derivatives are magniﬁed by LP. As noted earlier, the relative price of good 2
is independent of AP: ∂p/∂AP =0 .
In order to evaluate the impact of changes in AP on the steady-state welfare of both
countries, we deﬁne:







with Ij denoting country j’s income net of depreciation, measured in units of good 1. Since
the relative price p does not change across steady-states, from equations (5), (6), (14) and
(15) we see that the impact of AP on consumption (and therefore on welfare) is conﬁned to
its impact on a particular country’s income, Ij.
For the poor country, a positive relationship between IP and AP is immediately apparent.
However, for the rich country, higher AP decreases output in sector 1 but increases it in sector
2. Simple algebra shows that:
IR = cA1
RLR + e(APLP − (mP + mR)), (21)
where c and e are again positive constants. Therefore, AP has a positive eﬀect also on the
rich country’s income net of depreciation. As with L1
R, the impact of AP on IR is magniﬁed
by the size of the poor country’s labor force.
The improved eﬃciency of the poor country enables the rich country to redirect its re-
sources to sector 2, where it has a comparative advantage, thereby increasing IR.M o r e o v e r ,
it is straightforward to show that the world’s output of good 1 also increases even when
the poor country alone becomes more eﬃcient. When AP is higher, the steady state “en-
dowment” of both goods in the world is strictly higher; one can thus think of the improved
productive eﬃciency as increasing both sides of an Edgeworth box.
23A p p e n d i xA . 2p r e s e n t st h ec o m p l e t ee x p r e s s i o n sr e l e v a n tt ot h i ss u b s e c t i o n .
24It is important to note that the scale eﬀe c ti sp r e s e r v e dw h e nt h ep r o b l e mi sf o r m u l a t e di nt e r m so fp e r
worker utility, since what is relevant is the ratio of labor forces, Lp/LR.
15The positive relationship between IP and AP, together with the consumption equations
(5) and (6), imply that the poor country’s consumption of both goods will also vary positively
with AP. Similarly, the result in (21) together with consumption equations (14) and (15),
imply that the rich country also consumes more of both goods when AP is higher. Therefore,
in the non-specialization regime, both regions unambiguously beneﬁtf r o mam o r ee ﬃcient
sector 1 in the developing world. Below, we present the indirect utility functions of both
countries evaluated at the steady-state (ignoring constants):
VP =

















Assuming for the moment mR = mP = m, it can be shown that ∂2VR/(∂AP∂m) > 0;
in other words the welfare eﬀect for the rich country of an increase in AP is magniﬁed by
the inferiority of good 1. In the absence of a terms of trade eﬀect, the eﬀect on steady
state welfare is driven only by the GNP net of the minimum consumption. The higher this
minimum, the greater is the percentage eﬀect of labor reallocation toward the rich country’s
production of the luxury good. The increase in IR outweighs the direct negative eﬀect of m
on the rich country’s welfare.
Though the steady state consumption of both goods increases for the poor country, it
increases by a higher percentage for good 2 given that it is a luxury good. The claim often
made in policy discourse that improving the condition of the poor countries can only expand
the global market for the goods produced by the rich countries is validated in this case.
(4) Next we brieﬂy sketch the implications of an improvement in the rich country’s eﬃciency
in its own sector 1 (higher A1
R). From (20), we see that L1
R depends positively on A1
R.T h i s
implies that the rich country’s output in sector 1 will increase with A1
R; output in sector 2
decreases, however, both through the reduction in the labor assigned to it and through a




















Since the relative price of good 2 does depend on the rich country’s technological parameters,
there will also be a terms of trade eﬀect: ∂p/∂A1
R > 0. From (21), it follows that the rich
country’s steady state income, IR, will increase; the poor country’s income, IP, is unaﬀected
by changes in A1
R.
What are the welfare eﬀects of a change in A1
R?S i n c eIP does not change, but the terms






rich country has essentially become more competitive in the poor country’s export industry.
For the rich country, however, the relationship is ambiguous since IR and p both increase






. In fact, the condition for welfare to








RLR + mR >
(1 − θ)βρ
ρ + δ (1 − β)
(APLP − mP). (24)
Clearly, if the poor country is a large producer of the necessity, this condition will not be
met and the rich country will actually lose from an improvement of A1
R; such a change will
induce a shift of resources toward a sector of comparative disadvantage.25 An increase in
A1
R decreases the incentive to accumulate capital, used only in the production of good 2.
Steady-state capital and the economy’s production of good 2 decreases; this intensiﬁes the
increase in p and the increase in income is not suﬃcient to outweigh the negative eﬀect of
price on welfare.26
Even if condition (24) is met and the eﬀect on VR of added eﬃciency in domestic agricul-
ture is positive, the following condition is suﬃcient for the rich country to prefer a marginal










This is another manifestation of the non-rival nature of technology; the rich country prefers
an improvement in the technology that can be exploited by the larger force. And as men-
tioned earlier, it is the ratio of labor forces that matters; the scale eﬀect is not an artifact of
formulating the problem in aggregate rather than per capita terms.






ρ + δ (1 − β)
(ρ + δ)(1− β)
¶
A1
RLR >A PLP − (mP + mR). (26)
This assumption is likely to be satisﬁed when: A1
R is large enough relative to AP, LR is not
too small relative to LP,t h emsa r es u ﬃciently large, θ is large enough to make the world
consumption needs of good 1 large, and β is high enough to make capital, rather than labor,
more important for the production of good 2. In particular, the presence of the msm a k e si t
more likely for the previous condition to be satisﬁed.
In the next section, we characterize the equilibrium of this two-country world when AP is
large enough so that the non-specialization condition (26) fails to hold, and the rich country
specializes in the production of good 2.
25This is reminiscent of the result in Matsuyama (2000), where the poor may be made worse oﬀ by a
productivity improvement.
26I nt h es t a t i cm o d e l ,t h ea b s e n c eo ft h ee ﬀect on capital accumulation meant that an increase in A
1
R always
increases the welfare of the rich region, though possibly not as much as the one caused by an increase in AP.
In this sense, dynamic capital accumulation considerations make the possibility of the rich country improv-
ing an inappropriate technology more likely.
173.3 Steady State: Specialization
We make the following claim about the specialization steady state.
Claim 2 When (26) fails to hold, the rich country specializes in good 2. An increase in the
technology of the poor country, AP :
1. Leaves the rich country’s steady state capital stock and its production of good 2 un-
changed. However, its steady state terms of trade improves and increases its income.
The improvement in terms of trade is magniﬁed by the inferiority of good 1.
2. Increases the output and the welfare of the poor country if its output is large relative
to the minimum consumption levels.
3. Increases the steady state welfare of the rich country; this welfare eﬀect is magniﬁed
b yt h ed e g r e eo fi n f e r i o r i t yo fg o o d1 .
(1) Since L1









The steady-state capital stock does not depend on AP. If the rich region is specialized for
ag i v e nAP, we can see from (26) that it will continue to be specialized for higher APs;
therefore, increases in AP do not aﬀect output in the rich region. Total output of good
2 net of depreciation (δKR) in the steady state is also independent of the poor country’s
technology.
Let ¯ YR denote the rich country’s total output of good 2, net of depreciation, at the
steady-state. Then:
¯ YR ≡ Y 2





















= p¯ YR,s i n c eY 1
R =0 . If the relative price p depends on AP,s ow i l lt h ev a l u eo f
the rich country’s net output.
With specialization, the trade-balance condition simpliﬁes to: c1
R = pc2





APLP − mP − mR
¯ YR
. (28)
Unlike the non-specialization case, the steady state price now depends (positively) on AP.
An increase in world output of good 1, with no increase in good 2, increases the relative
price p.






APLP − mP − mR
. (29)
18This elasticity increases with the minimum consumption levels. The minimum consumption
level thus provides an ampliﬁcation of incentives for the rich region to improve the technology
of the poor region; the higher the relative superiority of good 2, the stronger the terms of
trade eﬀect for the rich country.
(2) Inspection of (5) shows that the poor country’s consumption of good 1 depends positively




APLP − mP − mR
¯ YR.
Therefore, c2
P is a decreasing function of AP under specialization. Since p increases with AP,
equations (14) and (15) unambiguously show that both c1
R and c2
R increase with AP.
Steady-state utilities can be read from equations (22) and (23). Below, we specialize
those equations taking advantage of the speciﬁc formulas for the price and output associated






ln(IP − mP) − (1 − θ)ln(IP − mP − mR)+( 1− θ)ln¯ YR
¤
. (30)
It can be seen that, if APLP >m P +mR/θ,t h e n∂VP/∂AP > 0; this ensures that the income
eﬀect for the poor country due to an increase in AP is stronger than the price eﬀect.27 If
this condition does not hold, a donation of technology can be “immiserizing” for the poor
country.28





(1 − θ)ln¯ YR +l n[ ( 1− θ)(IP − mP) − mR] − (1 − θ)ln(IP − mP − mR)
¤
. (31)
For the rich country, it is always the case that ∂VR/∂AP ≥ 0 and the inequality is strict
whenever mR > 0;t h ew e l f a r ee ﬀect can never be negative for the developed world.29
In (31), IP is the only determinant of VR that changes with AP.W h e n w e s e t mR =
mP = m, we can show ∂2VR/(∂IP∂m) > 0; therefore, the welfare eﬀect of an increase in
AP is magniﬁed by the inferiority of good 1 here also. Unlike the non-specialized case, the
entire eﬀect is due to a more favorable terms of trade for the rich country; and as seen in
(29), the elasticity of the relative price of good 2 with respect to AP increases with m.T h i s
elasticity decreases with LP which again points to the disincentive the rich country might
have in raising the poor country’s life expectancy.
27If θ>1/3, assumption (4) will automatically imply this condition.
28Also see Matsuyama (2000) in this regard.
29We also note that the relative price of good 2 is continuous across the specialization and non-specialization
regimes, as are the steady-state utility functions, VP and VR. However, there is a discontinuity in the
derivatives of VR and VP with respect to AP at the critical value of AP that triggers specialization.
19Even though the consumption of good 2 by the poor country, c2
P,d e c r e a s e sw i t hAP, its
value, pc2
P, increases; the percentage increase of expenditure on good 2 is still higher than on
good 1. Therefore, the global market for the good produced by the rich countries increases
here too, in value if not in actual units of goods.
Since the rich country does not produce good 1, we do not compare the welfare eﬀects
of marginal improvements in AP and A1
R.
4 Welfare Experiments with Costly Improvements
In this section, we complement the previous analysis by incorporating the cost of improving
AP. This allows us to compare the optimal investment each country would make in technol-
ogy improvements to the eﬃcient outcome as given by the solution to a planner’s problem.
Given our assumption that the poor cannot credibly commit to make payments for R&D,
the comparison between the rich country’s selﬁsh investment with the eﬃcient outcome is of
special interest.
This analysis will allow us to answer questions of the following nature:
1. Suppose, an invention (idea) for improving AP arrives exogenously — for example, an
academic paper on a high-yield seed variety suitable to the tropics, or one on a new
possibility for treating malaria. Given costly adoption, how much is each country
willing to invest in the invention and create a usable technology out of it — that is,
develop a seed or a malarial drug based on the idea?
2. Suppose an idea for improving both AP and A1
R arrive exogenously. Given costly
adoption, are there any conditions under which the rich country chooses to invest in
AP instead of A1
R? In other words, are the earlier conclusions about the rich country’s
preference for improving inappropriate technology robust to the inclusion of costs?
4.1 The Planner’s Problem
Suppose γ and (1 − γ) are the Pareto weights the planner places on the poor and rich





































subject to the following constraints:
c1
P + c1














˙ KR = iR − δKR.
20Since there are no production externalities in this economy, the planner’s optimal choice of
L1
R and iR coincides with the solution to the decentralized problems in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
We deﬁne Y j as the as the worldwide output in sector j, net of depreciation where relevant:
Y 1 ≡ YP + Y 1
R, Y 2 ≡ Y 2
R − δKR.














R =( 1− γ)Y 2














In order to improve the technology from AP to A0
P, a country has to expend resources.
We assume that this cost, incurred in terms of good 2 (the manufacturing good), is given by



















In this section, the analysis is conﬁned to steady-state comparisons (see section 5 for analy-
sis of transitions). Steady-state expressions for income and factor allocations are used to
evaluate beneﬁts from improvements. To make the cost compatible with this interpretation,
we assume that the investment cost is borne in the steady-state in the form of a perpetual
payment, rc(AP,A 0
P),w h e r er is the interest rate.30
In order to compute the planner’s optimal choice of investment, we must therefore sub-
tract rc(AP,A 0
P) from the right-hand side of (33)31. The planner’s ﬁrst-order condition for
























30This assumption might seem contradictory given that the economies have been set up originally as closed
economies. In the appendix section A.4, we show that even if the interest rate is determined endogenously
by the developed world’s behavior, an empirically plausible supposition, the results are qualitatively similar.
31We ignore the implications that the explicit introduction of costly investment have on the equilib-
rium quantities derived in sections 3.2 and 3.3. For example, total output of the rich country under non-
specialization, IR (Ap), would now depend on its expenditure on technology improvement. Since this does
not alter the qualitative results below, and the magnitude of this cost is likely to be very small relative to the
size of the rich country’s GNP, we choose to not consider this explicitly; in other words, we do not derive a
new set of equilibrium conditions.
We also ﬁnd it analytically convenient to consider welfare changes when the technological change leaves
the regime for the rich country — non-specialized or specialized — unchanged. We postpone the discussion of
a switch in regime to the sections on dynamics and the numerical simulation.
21where λW
1 and λW
2 represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (32) and
(33), respectively.
Before analyzing equation (35), it is useful to derive the optimal investment rule when
countries act on their own accord. We again consider the specialization and non-specialization
cases separately.
4.2 Individual Investment Under Non-Specialization
We prove the following claim in this subsection:
Claim 3 In the non-specialized regime:
1. If the same cost function for improving technologies applies to both countries, the poor
country will invest more in improving its own technology than the rich country. A
social planner would invest more in improving the poor country’s technology than either
country would.
2. If the labor force of the poor country is large enough, the rich country would prefer to
improve the poor country’s technology rather than its own; that is, it would prefer an
investment in the inappropriate rather than the appropriate technology.
(1) As we did in the planner’s problem, we subtract the cost rc(AP,A 0
P) from the resource

























Recall that an increase in AP increases the rich country’s income, IR, but has no eﬀect on
the terms of trade, p. Therefore, the optimal investment condition will equate the marginal




















Since IR is strictly increasing in AP and the marginal cost of zero investment is zero, it
follows from the above ﬁrst-order condition that the rich country will always undertake
positive investment in AP.















Therefore, if the poor country could aﬀord to pay the research cost rc(A0
P,A P),i tw o u l d
also undertake strictly positive investment in AP.
One can evaluate the marginal beneﬁts in (36) and (37) and show that under the plausible
conditions of δ>ρand β<2/3, the poor would invest a greater amount than the rich;
22the eﬀect on the income of the poor is more direct, through improved technology, while the
eﬀect on the rich is indirect, through labor reallocation.
Next, we compare the optimal investment choices of individual countries with that of the
planner, given by (35). It is easy to show that the ratio λW
1 /λW
2 coincides with the inverse
of the terms of trade 1/p obtained in the decentralized environment. Comparing (35) with
(36) and (37), we see that the beneﬁt from technology improvement, as seen by the planner,
corresponds to the sum of the beneﬁts perceived by the individual countries. Consequently,
the eﬃcient investment in technology improvement exceeds the investment undertaken by
either country acting on its own.
The eﬃcient investment characterized in (35) would result in a decentralized setting if
markets exist for the rich country to sell or license technology improvements in AP to the
poor; such markets have been assumed away in our setup. The rich country would then
evaluate the impact of R&D in inappropriate technology on the direct increase in the poor
country’s output in addition to the indirect eﬀect on its own output. Since the rich country
imports good 1 from the poor country, its representative agent views the beneﬁts from
the poor country’s productivity improvement as if it were an improvement in his domestic
productivity.
(2) Finally, we address the possibility of appropriate as opposed to inappropriate technology
investment by the rich country. If the rich country could improve its own domestic agricul-
tural sector, say by incurring the same quadratic cost function as above, could it be the case
that it would still prefer to improve AP rather than A1
R? In the appendix (Section A.3), we
show that this is indeed possible if LP is suﬃciently large. This should not come as a surprise
given our result in Section 3.2 that higher A1
R may even be detrimental to the rich. Even if
this does not happen, recall that the rich country’s incentive to invest in the poor country’s
technology, AP, is ampliﬁed by the size of its labor force, LP. The endogenous response of
technology improvement to the poor country’s labor force (the scale eﬀect) makes it more
likely that the rich country would choose to improve the poor country’s technology rather
than its own, provided this labor force is large enough.
The rich country’s preference for improving inappropriate technology at the expense of
appropriate technology is therefore robust to the inclusion of costs of improvement.
4.3 Individual Investment under Specialization
In this subsection, we substantiate the following claim:
Claim 4 In the specialized regime:
• If the same cost function for improving technologies applies to both countries, the rich
country will invest more in improving the poor country’s technology than the poor coun-
try would do on its own (provided θ is small enough). A social planner would invest
23more than what the poor country would, and when θ is small enough, less than what
the rich country would.
Under specialization, the beneﬁts to the rich come from the terms of trade eﬀect, only.









In words, the net beneﬁt for the rich is the added revenue from exports that the improved
terms of trade induce.


















The (marginal) positive impact of enhanced eﬃciency on output net of the added cost of
imports (in the form of consumption and technology investment) is equated to the marginal
cost. The inequality θ<0.5 is suﬃcient to ensure that the investment by the rich exceeds
that of the poor.32
Under non-specialization, the steady state relative price, p, depends only on the rich
region’s parameters. In the centralized version, the corresponding multipliers λW
1 and λW
2
are pinned down by the allocation of LR between the two sectors, and do not interact with
the planner’s preference parameter, γ, which determines the fraction of the world’s output
that the planner allocates to each country. However, in the decentralized environment under
specialization, the trade balance condition determines p as a function of the ratio of the
output of the rich relative to that of the poor. The terms of trade in turn govern decentralized
consumption. Therefore, in the centralized version, the above-mentioned multipliers depend
on γ.In order to make the decentralized and planning investment decisions comparable under
specialization, we assume γ is such that the planner’s allocation of consumption replicates




The eﬃcient investment is characterized by equation (35), as before; however, recall that
higher AP aﬀects neither Y 1
R nor Y 2













The planner’s preference weights are ﬁxed in our formulation. Unlike the poor country, the
planner is not concerned with redistributive eﬀects of a change in p. Therefore, a comparison
of (38) and the poor country’s condition, indicates that the planner would invest more.













P =( 1− θ)
YP − mP
YP − mP − mR
LP,
whereas the marginal investment from the planner’s point of view is simply ∂YP
∂AP = LP.
Therefore, for small enough θ (that is, the weight on the luxury good in the utility function
is high enough) or large enough mR, the rich country will invest more than the planner.
Unlike the planner, the rich country is concerned mainly with the change in its terms of
trade, which is high when θ is low and mR is high.
5D y n a m i c s
The steady state comparison of the two regimes reveals stark contrasts; in the non-specialization
regime, it is the poor country that wants more technology improvement and in the specialized
regime it is the rich country that desires greater improvement. As we saw, this is driven by a
pure factor reallocation eﬀect in the non-specialized regime and a pure terms of trade eﬀect
in the specialized regime. Is the contrast as stark when the transition to the new steady
state is included? Are there transitional forces that counteract those seen in steady state
comparisons? To answer these questions, to get an insight into the mechanics of the model,
and to set the stage for a more realistic quantitative assessment, we study the transitional
dynamics in this section.
5.1 Non-specialization
We start by deriving the diﬀerential equations that characterize the dynamics in the regime
where the rich country does not specialize. We seek these equations in the capital stock KR,
a state variable, and L2
R ≡ LR − L1
R, a jumping variable; this choice of the dynamic system
variables happens to be convenient. Note that we can back out the price p in terms of these












In particular, note that, for a given KR, p increases with L2
R, which will happen at the
instant AP is increased. Indeed, all other variables can be backed out from these two system
variables.
In Appendix A.5, we derive and present the diﬀerential equations for KR and L2
R;t h e s e
equations characterize the dynamics and are used to derive the steady state. In Appendix
A.6, we use phase diagrams to argue that the transition paths for the labor allocation to
good 1, the relative price, and the capital stock are as shown in Figure 1, and prove the
following claim:
25Claim 5 A sudden increase in AP, which still obeys the non-specialization condition causes:
• T h er e l a t i v ep r i c e ,p, and the labor devoted by the rich country to good 2, L2
R, to jump
to higher levels at the moment of the increase in AP.
• Over transition, this price steadily decreases to the old steady state value; the labor
allocated to good 2 decreases to its new, higher steady state value.
• Capital increases monotonically from its old steady state value to its new, higher steady
state value.
In the very short run, KR is ﬁxed; any increase in rich-country labor allocated toward
good 2 is not enough to counteract the increase in the poor-country supply of good 1 due to
t h ei n c r e a s ei nAP. The output of good 1 increases relative to that of good 2, and the relative
price, p, jumps.33 But KR, and thus the supply of good 2, increase over time, which brings
the price back to its previous level. Therefore, when the transition to the new steady state
is included, there is a terms of trade eﬀect as seen in the steady state consideration of the
specialization regime; it is in this sense that the inclusion of dynamics makes the dichotomy
between the non-specialized and specialized steady states less stark.
Figure 1
Dynamics without specialization: Transition paths after an increase in AP
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We can no longer use the L2
R variable in the specialized regime for obvious reasons; we
instead use KR and p as our dynamic system variables. In the specialized regime, the only





one; every other condition holds with
33The initial jump in L
2
R could be high enough to cause the rich region to temporarily specialize in good 2.
26L1
R =0 . We derive the diﬀerential equations that characterize the dynamic system, and the
steady state that follows, in Appendix A.7.
When the rich country is specialized initially, any increase in AP will only reinforce
specialization; see (26). There will be no change in the rich country’s steady state capital;
the steady state price will increase due to an increase in the production of good 1. The
adjustment is instantaneous; therefore, dynamic considerations do not alter the steady state
comparisons made earlier.
When the rich country is non-specialized initially, the dynamics are more interesting. In
Appendix A.8, we provide phase diagrams for both these cases and show that the transition
paths for the relative price and capital stock when the rich region is initially non-specialized
are as shown in Figure 2, and prove the following claim.
Claim 6 A sudden increase in AP:
• When the rich country is already in a specialized regime causes the price, p, to increase
immediately to its new steady state value. There is no change in the steady state stock
of capital.
• When the rich country is initially non-specialized, and the increase causes it to become
specialized, the stock of capital increases toward its new steady state value monotoni-
cally. The price overshoots its ﬁnal steady state value at the moment of the increase
in AP, and decreases over time to it.
Figure 2
Dynamics with specialization: After an increase in AP;n o n - s p l . →spl.
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As in the case without specialization, an increase in AP causes the output of good 1 to
increase relative to that of good 2; given the initially ﬁxed nature of the capital stock, p
27increases. As the capital stock increases, thereby increasing the output of good 2, this price
decreases over time.
In summary, when the transition is included, there is always a terms of trade eﬀect in
favor of the rich country.
6 Quantifying the Eﬀects
In this section, we examine the historical episode of the Green Revolution in light of our
model. The Green Revolution closely resembles the experiments we describe in Section 4; rich
countries undertook research to improve agricultural technology speciﬁct op o o rc o u n t r i e s .
We view this as a positive change in the technological coeﬃcient, AP, of the developing
world. We now attempt to quantify the eﬀects of this episode by choosing empirically
plausible values for the parameters of our model and simulating it numerically. This allows
us to assess the welfare beneﬁts of the Green Revolution including transition. We ignore the
costs of technology improvements for this exercise, which, as mentioned in the introduction,
are not very high.34
We choose ρ =0 .07,δ=0 .09, and β =0 .35 (capital share in rich countries), values
typically used in calibrating dynamic models. We set mP = mR =0 .55, which yield minimum
consumption values that are 80 − 85% of the poor region’s consumption of good 1.35 We
start by setting θ =0 .1, and later study the dependence of the results on θ.36 We normalize
LP =1 . Based on the ratio of the population in high income countries to that in the rest
of the world in 1980, we set LR =0 .217. We normalize AP =1 . Evenson and Gollin (2001)
report that rice yields increased by a factor of 2 between 1961 and 2000; gains in other crops
34In Fernandes and Kumar (2003), we also attempt to quantify the eﬀects of the Green Revolution by direct
recourse to historical data and counterfactual simulations (provided in Evenson and Rosegrant (2001)).
35Our choice of m was motivated by the following analysis. Under the interpretation that the minimum
consumption requirements are subsistence levels, we ﬁrst used the $1 a day standard of the 1990 World
Development Report of the World Bank (measured in 1985 international PPP prices). This would imply
a yearly amount of $365 for subsistence alone, a number which the data suggested was signiﬁcantly above
the annual per capita consumption of the developing countries. (Our data comes from the United Nations
Development Program, the Statistical Annex to the 2000 Human Development Report.) As a consequence,
we set m to 80% of the per capita food consumption of the poor in the years before the Green Revolution
took place. Results, however, are not sensitive to the choice of m. For more retails, see Fernandes and Kumar
(2003).
36We impute per capita food consumption at the onset of the Green Revolution as the product of the share
of food consumption (as a fraction of total household consumption) times per capita disposable income (net
of saving). Once we know the value of c
1
P, and given the value of m already established, we use the formula
c1
P = θIP +( 1− θ)mP from our model to solve for the preference parameter θ.T h e n u m b e r θ =0 .1 is
the simple average between the two magnitudes of θ we obtained for the rich and poor countries, of 0.12 and
0.09, respectively. Again, see Fernandes and Kumar (2003) for further details.
28were not as spectacular. We therefore consider a wide range of values for A
0
P,t h ep o s t -
Green Revolution technology index: 1.3, 1.5, and 2.0. Finally, we set A1
R = A2
R =8 .3AP to
correspond to the productivity diﬀerences between the richest and poorest countries reported
by Hall and Jones (1999; p. 92) for the year 1985.
In a stylized model such as ours, it will not be possible to quantitatively account for
the tariﬀ schedules adopted by diﬀerent countries. Moreover if poor countries experience
economic growth for reasons beyond an increase in AP, they could end up as net importers
of food; their demand for food can outstrip domestic supply. Trying to match trade ﬂow
data would run into diﬃculties, as there would be a confounding of increases in tariﬀsa n d
unmodeled increases in economic growth with productivity gains arising from the Green
Revolution; this is the primary reason we make contact with the terms of trade data in
t h i ss e c t i o nr a t h e rt h a nw i t ht r a d eﬂow data directly. We brieﬂyc o n s i d e rt a r i ﬀs in the next
section.
The rich region is non-specialized before the transfer of technology to the poor region.
The pre-Green Revolution steady state equilibrium quantities are:





∗ =0 .18; (p)∗ =0 .32.
In Table 3 we present the post-Green Revolution outcomes under the above-mentioned as-
sumptions on the ﬁnal productivity index, A
0
P; outcomes under the new level of technology
are denoted by primes.37
Table 3 — Simulation Outcomes










∗ SS Tran. SS Tran.
A
0
P =1 .3AP (nspl→nspl) 18.32 0.212 0.323 32.2% 31.0% 9.7% 7.2%
A
0
P =1 .5AP (nspl→spl) 18.75 0.217 0.523 16.6% 14.2% 17.4% 13.9%
A
0
P =2 .0AP (nspl→spl) 18.75 0.217 1.177 0.29% -1.46% 35.2% 30.9%
In the ﬁrst case, the new level of technology in the poor region is not high enough to
cause the rich one to specialize. As seen in Section 3, the steady state capital of the rich
country, as well the labor it devotes to the production of good 2, increase in response to
an increase in AP, both by 17.7%. The steady state price does not change; as mentioned
earlier, the long run capital-labor ratio and thus the price are pinned down completely by
the rich country’s parameters. However, the transition price is higher than the steady state
price overshooting by about 5% at the time of the transfer. The welfare gain is shown as an
equivalent variation in baseline income, considering only steady states, as well as including
the transition, which is nearly complete in 35 years. When the transition is included, the
37The diﬀerential equations for the dynamic system were computed using MATLAB’s ode23 routine; the
program is available from the authors.
29beneﬁt to the poor country (31%) outstrips the beneﬁt to the rich (7.2%); the rich country’s
gain is, however, not trivial. If welfare across steady states alone were compared, both
countries would achieve even higher welfare gains. For the poor country, the increase in the
price of its import good during transition tempers welfare gains. For the rich country, the
initial increase in investment reduces consumption and tempers welfare gains.
In the second and third cases, the increase in AP is high enough to cause the rich
country to specialize. The increase in resources devoted to the production of good 2 is more
pronounced.38 The steady state price is no longer pinned down by the capital-labor ratio of
the rich country and increases, by about 62% in the second case, and by more than 250% in
the third case. Alternately, the relative price of good 1 (“food”) drops by 38% in the second
case, and 72% in the third; the decrease of 50% in food prices reported in the sources cited in
the introduction is in between these two ﬁgures. As A
0
P increases, the welfare gain increases
for the rich region and decreases for the poor region. For instance, when A
0
P =1 .5AP,t h e
beneﬁt to both countries is about the same. When A
0
P =2 .0AP, the beneﬁtt ot h er i c h
country is more than 30% of baseline income; the poor country’s welfare actually decreases
once the transition is included. These ﬁgures are consistent with the earlier theoretical results
— the large increases in the rich country’s terms of trade when it is specialized, beneﬁtt h e
rich country more than the poor country.
T h ec h o i c eo fθ, the parameter that weights food in the utility function, could be open to
debate. Therefore, we examine the eﬀect on welfare when θ is increased for the intermediate
case of A
0
P =1 .5AP. Welfare increases, but only for the poor country — it increases from
14.2% when θ =0 .1 to 48% when θ =0 .3; for the rich country, it drops from 13.9% to
0.4%.39
38Note that there there is an increase in the capital stock of country 2 because we are moving to the
specialized regime from a non-specialized regime.
39In the direct computation presented in Fernandes and Kumar (2003), the welfare gains from the Green
Revolution correspond to a 10% equivalent variation in the vase year income. This increases monotonically
with θ and reaches 40% for the case θ =0 .3. The results are similar across rich and poor countries. These
ﬁgures, though not trivial, might seem small (especially considering the close to 160% increase in income for
the poor and 125% increase in income for the rich seen in this forty-year period). However, they appear sizeable
when one realizes that we have attempted to isolate one single event from the many forces governing income
growth over the last forty years. Moreover, as the quote from Evenson and Gollin (2001) in the introduction
eloquently asserts, millions of people who are alive today owe their lives to the Green Revolution, an eﬀect
that cannot be captured by the per capita analysis we have been constrained to do.
The possibility of isolating changes, which the simulation analysis enables, could explain the larger welfare
g a i n s ,a sw e l la st h ei n t e r e s t i n gd i ﬀerences between the gains of the rich and the poor discussed above.
307 A Discussion on Tariﬀs
As mentioned in the introduction, our focus diﬀers considerably from that of the tariﬀ
literature. Under reasonable parametrization, technology improvements can beneﬁtt h er i c h
and the poor countries; on the other hand, even if beneﬁts accrue to the rich country when
tariﬀs are levied, they necessarily hurt the poor country. Even these beneﬁts seem more
of a theoretical possibility, as in reality retaliatory tariﬀs follow. Our representative agent
setup is also not suited to study the political and distributional issues that often accompany
discussions on tariﬀs. In spite of these reservations, we provide a brief discussion of tariﬀsi n
this section. Our aim is to illustrate how the levying of tariﬀs might interact with technology
improvements as well as to study the robustness of the welfare estimates presented in the
previous section to the addition of tariﬀs. In fact, protectionist policies were prevalent in the
OECD countries even as the productivity of agriculture in poor countries was on the rise.
These could have negated some of the welfare gains.
We assume that the government of the rich region levies a tariﬀ of rate τ on good 1, its
import good. The price of this good in the rich country is now (1 + τ). The results crucially
depend on what is done with the collected tariﬀs; we assume that the government repatriates
all revenues in a lumpsum fashion to the consumer, as suggested by Dixit and Norman (1980,
p. 153).40.
The rich country’s welfare increases with the tariﬀ rate when it is non-specialized and
decreases when it is specialized. When there is no specialization, the increase in surplus to
producers of good 2 and in the revenues collected increase welfare. The poor will lose due
to an increase in p. In fact, the model is not well posed to answer the question of optimal
tariﬀs for the rich country. The optimum in the usual case is governed by the inverse of the
foreign country’s supply elasticity; since the foreign (poor) country’s supply is inelastic here
by assumption, welfare always increases. The analysis, however, does point to the intriguing
possibility that the rich country can use an increase in (AP) or an increase in tariﬀs (τ)
as alternate instruments to increase its own welfare. Only the technology improvement will
beneﬁt both countries; the poor lose with tariﬀs. Motives of altruism and self-interest can
be reconciled if the rich country chooses technology improvement over tariﬀs.41 When the
rich country is specialized, an increase in tariﬀs decreases p; the poor country exports less
of its good 1, and can aﬀord to import less of good 2 from the rich country. The absence of
a producer surplus from the increased price of good 1 and a loss of it in good 2, combined
with a loss of consumer surplus decrease the welfare for the rich. The poor actually gain due
to the decrease in p.
40Fernandes and Kumar (2003) also consider the case in which the government purchases both goods in
the same ratio as the consumers do and uses it for purposes that do not aﬀect utility.
41The study of these issues in a model amenable to the analysis of optimal tariﬀs is left for future research.
31The harm caused to the developing countries by the agricultural protectionism of the
developed countries has received considerable attention in the literature.42 But from the
quantitative point of view of our model, did the pro t e c t i o n i s tp o l i c yf o l l o w e db yt h ed e v e l o p e d
countries undercut the welfare gains reported in the previous section? Cohen and Sisler
(1971) analyze imports by Europe, Japan, UK, and the USSR from the LDCs and ﬁnd that
they grew in the 60s; imports of rice from LDCs, a crop particularly relevant to the Green
Revolution, grew at a healthy 7.2% a year. They conclude that the world demand for the
products exported by developing nations had been much stronger than predicted. Evidently,
protectionism did not completely choke oﬀ imports from the LDCs so as to overturn the
predictions of our model.
For reasons mentioned in the previous section, we do not calibrate the model to world
tariﬀs; we instead ask the question, “How high do tariﬀ rates have to be before the steady-
state welfare gains realized from an increase in AP are negated?” We assume a 50% increase
in AP, an intermediate value considered in the simulations; recall that the rich country goes
from being non-specialized to specialized in this case. The parameter values are the same
as those used earlier. A 25% tariﬀ rate is enough to negate the gains for the rich.43 The
tariﬀ rates, levied on rice, for instance, have varied widely across developed countries, with
low rates in the US and high rates in Japan. Nevertheless, it is clear that the rich countries
would realize greater gains from an increase in AP if they do not levy tariﬀso nt h ec r o p s
whose productivity they increase.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have demonstrated, under various assumptions, that rich countries have
an economic incentive to improve the technology speciﬁc to poor countries. While altruistic
and humanitarian considerations have cornered most public attention, we show there are also
economic reasons for the rich countries to become involved in solving problems particular to
developing countries. The estimated eﬀects on welfare for the Green Revolution, a classic case
of such an “intervention,” while not huge, are nevertheless positive. With the various changes
both rich and poor countries have undergone in the last forty years, isolating one episode in
a macro context is diﬃcult; we, therefore, view the positive results as an encouraging sign
for the applicability of our model.
In the numerical simulation presented in Section 6, we have assumed negligible costs for
42See Morisset (1998) for a recent example and the references therein.
43When the government uses the revenues to purchase goods for its own consumption, the tariﬀ rate has to
be more than 200% for the welfare gains from an increase in AP for the rich to be completely negated. For
the poor, a tariﬀ rate of 63% would negate their gains. These are high values even for protectionist regimes.
They also point to the importance of the assumption made regarding the disbursement of tariﬀ revenues.
32developing technologies. If enough data could be collected to allow the calibration of an
R&D cost function, we might be able to shed quantitative light on the optimal technological
investment by the rich country, thus complementing the theoretical analysis done in Section
4. As mentioned in the introduction, we have been silent on the issues of coordination
among rich countries that make such a collective endeavor possible in the ﬁrst place, as well
as on the nature of commitment, or lack thereof, by the poor to behave in ways expected
by the rich who donate the technology to them. Our representative agent framework also
dismisses political economy questions. Modeling these features explicitly will allow us to
better understand why such collective eﬀorts have not been more widespread and are limited
to certain types of technological improvements, most notably agriculture. These are topics
of ongoing research.
33A Appendix
A.1 The Static Model
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A.2 Results for Non-specialization Steady State
The precise formula for the equilibrium value of L1



















The change in L1














Total income in the rich country is:
IR =
(ρ + δ (1 − β))A1
RLR + βρ(1 − θ)(APLP − (mP + mR))
(1 − β)(ρ + δ)+βρθ
.
The world’s output of good 1 also increases with AP:
∂
¡





ρ + δ (1 − β)
(ρ + δ)(1− β)+θβρ
LP > 0.
34A.3 Inappropriate vs Appropriate Technology Investment





















We have already derived the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal investment in AP, in (36) The
































with the condition holding with equality if the investment in A1
R is strictly positive. The term within
the square brackets is equal to the poor country’s consumption of good 2, c2
P.


















(1 − β)(ρ + δ)+βρθ
LP, (41)
which depends positively on LP, a manifestation of the scale eﬀect mentioned earlier. Could it be
the case that the rich country prefers not to invest in its own, appropriate technology? This can




R is negative, since the marginal cost
















Some tedious algebra shows that the condition for this to happen is:
θ
1 − β










ρ + δ (1 − β)










0 indicates the new output of good 1 in the poor country given that the optimal
investment in AP is being undertaken. It can be shown that the coeﬃcient multiplying ((Y P)
0−mP)

















(1 − β)(ρ + δ)+βρθ
(LP)2.
Therefore, there exists a large enough LP to make the inequality (42) hold in a strict sense; this is
particularly so since (Y P)
0 includes a term in the square of LP.
Recall from section 3.2, that the rich country’s incentive to invest in the poor country’s tech-
nology, AP, is ampliﬁed by the size of its labor force, LP. With a quadratic cost speciﬁcation, the
improvement in AP is linear in LP. Given the production technology, YP = APLP, the square
term in the size of the labor force manifests in the above expression for the improved output. The
endogenous response of technology improvement to LP makes it more likely for the rich country to
improve the poor country’s technology rather than its own, if LP is large enough.
35A.4 Endogenizing the Interest Rate
In this section, we argue that endogenizing the interest rate, which enters the periodic cost of R&D will
not aﬀect the qualitative results. In order to endogenize r, we consider the decentralized environment
in which ﬁrms operate the technology and rent the capital stock from consumers. The problem of


















It is assumed that there exist competitive markets in the inputs capital and labor. Given this, the








− δ = r. (43)
This is the only additional condition needed to close the welfare analysis above when steady-states
are considered. Since no capital is used in the poor country, we can think of the expression found for
r in (43) as describing the world-wide interest rate. Given that the price p does not depend on AP
under the non-specialization regime, neither does the interest rate. The welfare analysis of section
4 goes through without further qualiﬁcations. In the specialization regime, however, we must take
into account the positive relationship between the interest rate and the price. As an example, the
















with an additional term on the right-hand side to capture the change in cost associated with the
change in the interest rate. This additional term should also be added to the ﬁrst-order condition of
country 1. These changes do not qualitatively aﬀect the analysis in the text.
A.5 Diﬀerential Equations for Non-Specialization
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R − (mP + mR)
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¢1−β. Use these, the law of motion





































Using, λ1p = λ and (16) in (13) we get:
˙ λ
λ


















Since the FOC is 1−θ
c2
R



























Diﬀerentiating (39) with respect to time, assuming the technology coeﬃcients of the rich country do
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A.6 P r o o fo fC l a i m5
We draw the phase diagram for the non-specialized system given in (45) and (47). Note that the







































37Clearly, KR is increasing in L2
R. When L2
R → 0,K R →− ∞ . When L2
R →∞ ,K R →∞ . At c L2
R,













We would like to focus attention on the range of positive values for capital; i.e. where L2
R > c L2
R.
To get the ˙ L2
R =0locus, note only the second term can be zero. This yields:
KR =
β (1 − β)(1− θ)




















as the locus. Clearly, KR is decreasing in L2
R. When L2
R → 0,K R →∞ . When L2
R →∞ ,K R →− ∞ .
At f L2










Again, we will focus attention on positive values for capital. It can be seen that f L2
R > c L2
R and, given
the nature of the two loci, a unique intersection, that is a steady state, exists.
To complete the ingredients of the phase diagram, note that, to the right of the KR =0locus,
KR is increasing since KR is increasing in L2
R; likewise to the left it is decreasing. Above the L2
R =0
locus, L2
R is increasing, since L2
R is increasing in KR. Likewise, below the locus it is decreasing. The
phase diagram is shown in Figure 3. The stable manifold is downward sloping.
Figure 3





































(both by the same factor, to keep, KR
L2
R
and thus p unaltered), c L2
R and f L2
R. Also, both loci shift
outward. The new phase diagram is shown in Figure 4.
The dotted lines show the new loci and the stable manifold. KR cannot jump at the time of
increase in AP. But L2
R does along the dotted arrow; it in fact overshoots and decreases along the
new manifold to its new steady state value. KR increases to its new steady state value along the new
stable manifold. From (39) we can see that the price p also jumps.
A.7 Diﬀerential Equations for Specialization
When all capital labor in the rich country is allocated to the production of good 2 we have:
˙ λ
λ














R in (44) and using the law of motion for capital yields the
following diﬀerential equation:














Again, using (44) it is possible to see that c1
R − mR is time-invariant and thus so is λ1 and hence











































A.8 P r o o fo fC l a i m6















T h el e f th a n ds i d ei si n c r e a s i n gi nKR for all values less than (KR)∗,S,w h i c hi sw h e r ew ew i l lf o c u s
attention. It is clear that the KR =0l o c u si sd e c r e a s i n gi np. From (48)w ec a ns e et h a tt ot h er i g h t










which is independent of p. From (49)w ec a ns e et h a t , above the locus (higher KR), p is increasing
and, below the locus, it is decreasing. The phase diagram for the specialized regime is given in Figure
5.
When AP increases, the KR =0locus shifts rightward, while the ˙ p =0locus is unchanged. For
a change in AP that cause eventual specialization by the rich country, there are two cases to consider
— the case where the rich country was specialized to begin with and where it was non-specialized.
Figure 5










40When the rich country is specialized initially, any increase in AP will only reinforce specialization;
see (26). There will be no change in the rich country’s steady state capital and the steady state price
will increase, which can be seen from the above expression for p∗
S where IP = APLP increases. The
adjustment is instantaneous, along the ˙ p =0locus as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6












When the rich country is non-specialized initially, the dynamics are more interesting.
Figure 7
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∗ <L R when the rich country is not specialized. From (12), one can see that when
the rich country is specialized it has to be the case that A1
R < (1 − β)pA2
R (KR)
β (LR)
−β , and for















where the expression for (KR)∗,S is used.
Therefore, during transition, the capital stock increases monotonically from (KR)∗,NS to (KR)∗,S
a c c o r d i n gt o( 48). From the phase diagram shown in Figure 7 (where only the new loci are shown
as they are the relevant ones), we can see that p overshoots and decreases monotonically to its new,
higher steady state level according to (49).
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